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Nuclear liability regimes are important as they ensure that potential victims will be compensated
promptly and efﬁciently after a nuclear accident. The accident at Fukushima Daiichi in Japan in 2011
prompted a review of the global nuclear liability regime that remains on-going. Progress has been slow,
but over the next few years the European Union is set to announce its new proposals. Meanwhile, in
2015, another global nuclear liability regime, the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nu-
clear Damage, has entered into force. This paper aims to move the debate in the literature on nuclear
liability and focuses on the four following major issues: (1) reviews third-party nuclear liability regimes
currently in operation around the world; (2) analyses the international nuclear liability regime following
the accident at Fukushima Daiichi; (3) comparatively assesses the liability regimes for nuclear energy and
the non-nuclear energy sector; and (4) presents the future outlook for possible developments in the
global nuclear liability regime.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
“Accidents and calamities…are the universal legislators of the
world.” Plato, The Laws.1
The accident at Fukushima Daiichi was a watershed moment for
the global nuclear energy industry that has since led to an industry-
wide revision of practices and regulations within the international
nuclear energy community. The estimated costs of the incident at
Fukushima Daiichi vary according to different calculations (as
detailed in Section 4) but in every case, the incurred costs of the
accident so far have been signiﬁcantly higher than existing capped
liability limits that are in operation around the world, as detailed
further in Section 2. This has prompted the international nuclear
energy community to scrutinise and revise what ‘liability’ means in
the sector.
‘Nuclear Liability’ has been an area of legal scholarship for many
decades, and has its roots especially in the area of tort law andmore).
roduction by Trevor J. Saun-
w (Harvard University Press
Ltd. This is an open access articlespeciﬁcally in relation to the examination of law and accidents.2
This article aims to advance the legal literature with not just a
focus on nuclear accidents themselves, but alsowe intend to extend
the discussion to: (1) a comparative review of the issues sur-
rounding nuclear liability internationally; and (2) a comparative
analysis of nuclear and non-nuclear energy accidents.
Nuclear accidents are transboundary in nature especially where
there is an off-site release of radioactive material. Hence, various
international liability regimes have been developed for the nuclear
energy sector to which countries can be members. The nuclear
energy sector demonstrates a level of international cooperation on
liability for transboundary pollution and damage that is not
observed in other parts of the energy industry. Nuclear liability
regimes are of vital importance for twomain reasons: (1) the ability
for the nuclear energy industry to function; and (2) for the pro-
tection of the public as potential victims of a nuclear accident. For
example, India is relying on signiﬁcant growth of its nuclear energy
sector to meet future electricity demands. However, as will be
described in Section 3, uncertainty surrounding the extent of their
liability for suppliers in its national liability regime has deterred
potential non-domestic investors. Furthermore, nuclear liability
regimes enshrine commonality that is important because of the
potential cross-boundary effects that a nuclear accident may have
on other countries.
Actions for damages and for injuries suffered are major areas of
law. In general, the issue of accidents and insurance is approachedunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
5 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83e703, 42 U.S.C. x 2011 et seq. (1954), as
amended by Pub. L. 85e256 (the “PriceeAnderson Act”) 42 U.S.C. x 2210.
6 Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 105-98, 42 U.S.C. x 19 (2005).
7 Helen Cook, The Law of Nuclear Energy (Sweet & Maxwell: Thomson Reuters
2013) 86e87.
8 The PriceeAnderson Act (n 5) ss (i).
9 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (29 July
1960), as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964, by the Protocol of
16 November 1982 and by the Protocol of 12 February 2004 (Paris Convention); the
most recent revision is not yet in force.
10 The countries that have ratiﬁed the Paris Convention are: Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, Turkey and United Kingdom. Austria and Luxembourg have signed
the Paris Convention but not ratiﬁed it. Switzerland has ratiﬁed the Paris
Convention but it does not take effect until the 2004 Protocol comes into force. It is
open to all OECD member countries and non-OECD countries if all the contracting
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nomic analysis of the law. Here there are two questions that will be
asked: (1) what is the effect of the legal rules (descriptive); and (2)
is the current system desirable and what should it look like
(normative)?3,4 This paper examines the issue of accidents and
insurance in the energy sector, and in particular, after a major ac-
cident. In this context, this paper provides four contributions: (1) it
examines the third-party nuclear liability regimes currently in
operation around the world and maps out the divergence between
liability limits in the event of an accident in the European Union; (2)
it analyses the international nuclear liability regime post the
Fukushima Daiichi accident; (3) it comparatively assesses the lia-
bility regimes for nuclear energy and the non-nuclear energy
sector; and (4) it presents the future outlook for possible de-
velopments in the global nuclear liability regime. More speciﬁcally,
Section 2 details the current global nuclear liability regime while
also analysing what it means if it is applied, i.e. if there were to be
an accident. Section 3 focuses on global nuclear liability regime in
light of the accident at Fukushima Daiichi, and Section 4 explores
the difference between third party liability regimes for different
energy sources. Finally, in Section 5, the paper advances the debate
on whether the current global nuclear liability regime is desirable
and points to what it should look like.
2. Current nuclear liability regimes
Many international institutions play a role in the energy sector.
One of the most inﬂuential in terms of the international energy
sector is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) which
plays a lead role in the international nuclear energy industry. There
are no similar UN-afﬁliated international institutions for other
energy sources. The IAEA is located in Vienna, Austria, and 162
countries are currently Member States. It acts as an international
driver of the nuclear energy sector, and it has a particular focus on
maintaining the safe operation of nuclear energy plants across the
world.
The IAEA is responsible for ensuring what are, in essence, global
safety and security standards for the industry. It also gives law and
policy advice, to assist countries in implementing laws to safely
develop nuclear energy infrastructures. The IAEA also plays a role in
the event of an accident. Themain action by the IAEA in this context
is its promotion of a liability regime for nuclear accidents. This
encompasses a number of international treaties on nuclear liability.
There are three main international liability agreements, and the
members of IAEA are all signed up to one or more of these three
agreements. There are two main international third party nuclear
energy liability regimes operating at present:
(1) the “Paris and Brussels” Conventions, that are under the
auspices of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD); and
(2) the “Vienna” Convention that is under the auspices of the
IAEA.
There also exists a third nuclear energy liability regime, which is
the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear
Damage (CSC), also under the auspices of the IAEA but which is
championed by the USA and while only a few countries have rati-
ﬁed it, the CSC recently came into force, as further detailed in
Section 5.3 ibid
4 Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press 2004).These liability regimes are an example of international cooper-
ation in one area of the energy sector. Such liability regimes are not
present for other energy sources and this highlights the value of
research in this area in that other energy sources and global in-
dustrial sectors can learn from the nuclear energy sector and the
liability regimes in place for accidents. A brief overview of the in-
ternational nuclear liability regimes currently in force are detailed
in Sections 2AeC.
2.1. The USA - PriceeAnderson Act of 1957
The ﬁrst nuclear liability regime was developed by the USA. The
USA's third-party liability convention operates under the Price-
eAnderson Act of 1957. This Act inserted the new Section 170 into
the Atomic Energy Act of 19545 and has been revised several times,
most recently by the Energy Policy Act of 20056 that extends its
application to the civil nuclear energy sector for a further 20 years.
The purpose of the PriceeAnderson Act is to provide a Federal
compensation fund should there be a nuclear accident. The Price-
eAnderson Act, in essence, requires each reactor site to pay an
annual premium. Insurance protection consists of two tiers: the
ﬁrst tier provides $375 million in liability insurance per incident
based on maximum level of private insurance available; the second
tier (if the ﬁrst tier is exhausted), allows each nuclear reactor site to
pay up to a maximum of $111.9 million per nuclear incident and is
classed as a retrospective premium equal to its proportionate share
of the excess loss (i.e. the loss beyond the ﬁrst tier amount of $375
million).7 Estimates of the US insurance pool suggest that $12.6
billion in insurance cover is available.7 Hence, The Act does limit
liability and does not guarantee payment should possible funds
already have been exhausted. Instead, in the instance where the
damages are likely to exceed the applicable amount of aggregate
public liability, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission will seek and
give recommendations for additional sources of funds from the US
government after they have conducted an assessment of potential
costs.8
2.2. The Paris and Vienna Conventions
Thereafter, the OECD established a nuclear liability regime with
the Paris Convention (PC) in 1960, which has since been updated in
1964 and 1982.9 It was signed ﬁrst by Western European states.10 It
requires ratiﬁcation by national legislation of a contracted state. It is
based on seven principles11 outlined in Table 1 below.countries agree.
11 For more discussion on these and more detailed review of the nuclear liability
regime prior to the accident at Fukushima Daiichi please see: Anthony Thomas and
Raphael J Heffron, ‘Third Party Nuclear Liability: The Case of a Supplier in the United
Kingdom’ (Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge, UK 2012) Working Paper
<http://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/242219> accessed 9 January 2016.
Table 1
The Seven Principles of the Paris Convention, as equally applicable to
the Vienna Convention.
Principle
1 Strict liability
2 Channelling liability to the operator
3 Limitation of liability in time
4 Limitation of liability in amount
5 Insurance or other ﬁnancial security
6 Jurisdiction
7 Applicable law
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to the PC in its aims and was signed in 1963 mainly by non-OECD
countries in Eastern Europe and Latin America.12 The two con-
ventions are similar in terms of the aforementioned seven princi-
ples but differ in number of other aspects such as ﬁnancial liability
limits, territorial scope and dispute resolution.13
The Brussels Supplementary Convention (BSC) was the next
development, and it was signed in 1963 by themajority of the same
countries that signed the PC.14 In essence, it is complimentary to
the PC and allowed additional funds to be made available to victims
of a nuclear accident.
The accident at Chernobyl in 1986 prompted the provision of
additional funds to victims of a nuclear accident. Notably, The Joint
Protocol that entered into force in 1992, which offers linkages be-
tween countries that adopted either the PC or the VC.152.3. The revised conventions and the CSC (new nuclear liability
limits)
The revised Vienna Convention (RVC) was introduced in 1997
and increased the minimum ﬁnancial security required from US$5
million to 300 million Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), broadened
the deﬁnition and geographical scope of nuclear damage and
increased the time-period for certain claims to be raised. 16,17 The
CSC (also introduced in 1997) in many ways is an alternative12 The full title is the: Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (21
May 1963) (Vienna Convention); Vienna Convention Countries are Argentina,
Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon,
Chile, Croatia, Cuba, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lebanon,
Lithuania, Mexico, Montenegro, Niger, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Republic
of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines, Senegal,
Serbia, Slovak Republic, The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and
Tobago, Ukraine and Uruguay.
13 DG Tren, European Commission, 2005. ‘TREN/CC/01e2005 Legal Study for the
Accession of Euratom to the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of
Nuclear Energy.’ Report < http://www.mng.org.uk/gh/private/2009_12_accession_
euratom.pdf> accessed 9 January 2016.
14 Convention of 31 January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29
July 1960, as amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964 and by the
Protocol of 16 November 1982 (Brussels Supplementary Convention); it entered
into force in 1974 and the following countries are a party to the Brussels Conven-
tion: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Austria, Luxembourg and
Switzerland have signed it but it is not in force.
15 1988 Joint Protocol on the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris
Convention (Joint Protocol).
16 1997 Protocol to amend the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage (Revised Vienna Convention).
17 The SDR is an international reserve asset, created by the IMF in 1969 to sup-
plement its member countries' ofﬁcial reserves <http://www.imf.org/external/np/
exr/facts/sdr.htm> accessed 9 January 2016. On July 26 2015, 1SDR ¼ 1.393 US$.
18 With regard to the CSC, ﬁrst-tier compensation corresponds to the amount
made available by a nation state; whereas second-tier compensation corresponds
to an international fund which Contracting Parties contribute toward that can be
used when ﬁrst-tier compensation is exhausted.nuclear liability convention. It can act as supplementary to the PC
and VC/RVC, providing an additional international fund that allows
second-tier compensation. 18 Countries not party to the PC or VC/
RVC can join the CSC so long as their national legislation is in
agreement with the provisions of the Annex to the CSC with the
ﬁrst-tier of compensation ﬁxed at 300 million SDRs. The CSC is
based on seven principles that are similar to that of the PC, as
shown in Table 1. The CSC required ratiﬁcation from at least ﬁve
countries that contain 400,000 units of installed capacity19 for it to
enter into force.
The other amendments take the form of the 2004 Protocol to
Amend the Paris Convention and the 2004 Protocol to Amend the
Brussels Supplementary Convention (hereafter referred to as the
revised Paris Convention (RPC) and revised Brussels Supplemen-
tary Convention (RBSC)). The aim of the RPC and RBSC was to in-
crease the scope of, limit of and time to claim compensation for
instances of loss of life and personal injury as a result of a nuclear
accident; with the Protocols having factored in the losses experi-
enced as a result of Chernobyl.20 The RPC plus RBSC now cover a
lower liability limit of V1.5 billion, and like the RVC broadened the
deﬁnition, geographical scope and timeliness for certain claims to
be raised.21 A summary of the losses that can be claimed is shown
below; it is noted that the PC only covers items (i)e(iii):
(i) loss of life or personal injury;
(ii) loss of or damage to property;
(iii) economic loss arising from (i) and (ii) above;
(iv) the costs of measures of reinstatement of impaired
environment;
(v) loss of income deriving from a direct economic interest in
any use or enjoyment of the environment; and
(vi) the cost of preventative measures including loss or damage
caused by such measures.
(vii) any other economic loss, other than any caused by the
impairment of the environment if permitted by general law
on civil liability of a competent court 22,232.4. The principle of channelling
One of the key principles of present nuclear liability regimes is
the channelling principle, where all liability is channelled to the
operator.24
The channelling principle is expressed best in the phrase from
the ﬁrst paragraph of IAEA Implementing Legislation drafting notes
(see Table 2 below) and along with the accompanying phrase from
both the Vienna and Paris Conventions “Except as otherwise pro-
vided in this Convention, no person other than the operator shall be19 Units of installed capacity refers to the thermal MW rating of the plant (referred
to as MWt). One unit is one MWt.
20 Julia A Schwartz, ‘Liability and Compensation for Third Party Damage Resulting
from a Nuclear Incident’, International Nuclear Law: History, Evolution and Outlook
(OECD 2010) <http://www.oecd-nea.org/law/isnl/10th/isnl-10th-anniversary.pdf>
accessed 9 January 2016.
21 This is a combined total from under the PariseBrussels regime and under a
three-tier compensation system with: the operator's ﬁnancial security will be at
least V700 million; the state in whose territory the liable operator's installation is
situated and will have liability up to V500 million; all of the contracting parties
may have a liability up to V300 million.
22 Carlton Stoiber and others, ‘Handbook on Nuclear Law: Implementing Legisla-
tion’ (2010) 104e106 <http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1456_
web.pdf> accessed 9 January 2016.
23 Paris Convention (n 9).
24 Cook (n 7) 177.
Table 2
IAEA Model provisions on Liability of the Operator provisions on Liability of the Operator. Stoiber and others (n 22).
Article##: liability of the operator
1. Subject to the provisions of this Law, only the operator of a nuclear installation shall be liable for nuclear damage wherever suffered, upon proof that such damage has
been caused by a nuclear incident at the operator's nuclear installation.
2. Liability for nuclear damage caused by nuclear material which was stolen, lost, jettisoned or abandoned lies with the operator who was last authorized to possess such
material
3. Liability for nuclear damage shall apply to nuclear damage wherever suffered.
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Through the nuclear liability regimes, liability is legally chan-
nelled (i.e. it can be considered as exclusive liability). In essence this
follows that a nuclear operator will be solely liable for the accident.
This means that all victims will be compensated by the operator
and reduces the cost burden for victims and the speed to which
they can receive compensation. The responsibility of suppliers to
nuclear operators falls on the operator themselves but in some
cases there may be speciﬁc clauses within contracts between the
operator and supplier in relation to the supplier being liable to a
certain degree.263. An International review of the nuclear liability regime
post-Fukushima
One issue surrounding the conventions is that not all countries
have signed and ratiﬁed (i.e., enter into force) these conventions,
especially themost recent revisions to the conventions. To illustrate
this, the map in Fig. 1 below highlights the ‘patchwork’ of con-
ventions that are in force in Europe. A synopsis from the most
recent OECD review of Liability Amounts and Financial Security
Limits27 is presented. At present, there are 21 countries that have
signed the RVC, of which 12 have ratiﬁed these. Of the 28 EU
Member States, only Latvia, Poland, and Romania have signed and
ratiﬁed the RVC; whilst the Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, and
Lithuania have signed the RVC. Under the non-legislative EU Act
2013/434/EU28: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Lithuania,
Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia are authorised to ratify the RVC.
The RPC has only been ratiﬁed by two countries: Norway and
Switzerland. It has been signed by 13 of the EU member states and
Turkey. One reason why there have been few ratiﬁcations of this
convention across Europe is that under EU directive 2004/294/EC29
all Member States (with exception of Austria, Denmark, Ireland, and
Luxembourg)30 should simultaneously ratify, i.e. enter into force
the revised Convention at the moment they sign the RPC.25 Revised Vienna Convention (n 16) art II para 5; Paris Convention (n 9) art 6b
26 Karine Fiore, ‘No-Fault Compensation Systems’ in Michael Faure (ed), Tort Law
and Economics (Edward Elgar Publishing 2009).
27 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Nuclear Operator
Liability Amounts and Financial Security Limits, July 2014’ <https://www.oecd-nea.
org/law/2014-table-liability-coverage-limits.pdf> accessed 9 January 2016.
28 Council Decision (EU) 2013/434/EU of 15 July 2013 authorising certain Member
States to ratify, or to accede to, the Protocol amending the Vienna Convention on
Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage of 21 May 1963, in the interest of the European
Union, and to make a declaration on the application of the relevant internal rules of
Union law [2013] OJ L220/1.
29 Council Decision (EC) 2004/294/EC of 8 March 2004 authorising the Member
States which are Contracting Parties to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on
Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy to ratify, in the interest of the
European Community, the Protocol amending that Convention, or to accede to it
[2004] OJ L97/53.
30 The exception of Austria, Ireland, and Luxembourg stems from Council Decision
2004/294/EC (n 29) only applying to Member States that are Contracting Parties to
the Paris Convention. Denmark is excepted due to Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on
the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on European Union and to the
Treaty establishing the European Community.Interestingly, all of the states that were members of the EU prior to
2004 signed the convention (albeit with reservations from Ger-
many, Austria, Greece, and Sweden). Of the post-2004 countries,
only Slovenia has signed the Convention (under Directive 2007/
727/EC31). It is suggested that the requirement of simultaneous
ratiﬁcation may act as a barrier to the majority of states ratifying
the RPC.32
With the ongoing uncertainty around which countries have
signed and ratiﬁed which conventions, the nuclear liability regime
was in a state of relative confusion prior to the accident at
Fukushima Daiichi. Burns (2012)33 has highlighted interesting
statistics that further demonstrate the level of uncertainty on the
potential effectiveness of existing nuclear liability regimes. His
conclusion is the majority (74 per cent) of the world's reactors in
operation or under construction are in eight states: Canada, China,
France, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and the US. More impor-
tantly however, six of these countries d Canada, China, Japan,
South Korea, India and the US d which account for 57 per cent of
the world's reactors that are either in operation or under con-
struction were until recently outside the scope of an international
third party nuclear liability regime. Both Japan and the US are now
as of April 2015 under the CSC liability regime.
There are renewed efforts post-Fukushima Daiichi to reduce the
uncertainty around nuclear liability regimes in Europe. The Euro-
pean Union, as stated earlier, is aiming to revise the nuclear liability
regime. In addition, the IAEA has called for a move towards
developing a global nuclear liability regime. This was agreed by
members of the IAEA in the IAEA's Action Plan on Nuclear Safety
that was developed in 2011 by the Board of Governors and
endorsed by all Member States at the IAEA General Conference in
2012.34A functional and transparent nuclear liability regime is
important from the context of the number of countries that aim to
build nuclear energy plants for the ﬁrst time. In addition, there are
new developments in the nuclear industry that also add to the case
for reform. For example, Chinese nuclear energy ﬁrms are planning
to enter the European market in the UK and Romania (a coopera-
tion agreement was signed in July 2014 and a contract is on
schedule to be signed).35 Russian and South Korean nuclear energy31 Council Decision (EC) 2007/727/EC of 8 November 2007 authorising the Re-
public of Slovenia to ratify, in the interest of the European Community, the Protocol
of 12 February 2004 amending the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third-Party
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy [2007] OJ L294/23.
32 Maxine Symington, ‘Nuclear Energy Policy Update: Key Recommendations from
the Conference on Nuclear Third Party Liability’ (Wragge Lawrence Graham & Co, 28
January 2014) <http://www.wragge-law.com/insights/nuclear-energy-policy-
update-key-recommendations-f/> accessed 9 January 2016.
33 Stephen G Burns, ‘A Global Nuclear Liability Regime: A Journey or a Destina-
tion?’ (2012) <http://www.burges-salmon.com/inla_2012/10156.pdf> accessed 9
January 2016.
34 International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘IAEA Action Plan on Nuclear Safety’
(2014) <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/ﬁles/actionplanns.pdf> accessed 9
January 2016.
35 World Nuclear Association, ‘Nuclear Power in Romania’ (November 2014)
<http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Proﬁles/Countries-O-S/Romania/>
accessed 9 January 2016.
Fig. 1. Nuclear Liability Regime in EU countries including Operator's liability. Constructed by authors from OECD data contained in n 27. Acronyms: Paris Convention (PC); Brussels
Supplementary Convention (BSC); Joint Protocol (JP); Revised Brussels Supplementary Convention (RBSC); Revised Paris Covention (RPC); Vienna Convention (VC); Revised Vienna
Convention (RVC); Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage (CSC).
Table 3
Section 17 of The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (2010). Civil Liability for Nuclear Damages Act, 2010 (n 37); The Civil Liability For Nuclear Damage Rules, 2011 (n 52).
Operator's right of recourse
17. The operator of the nuclear installation, after paying the compensation for nuclear damage in accordance with section 6, shall have a right of recourse where-
(a) such right is expressly provided for in a contract in writing;
(b) the nuclear incident has resulted as a consequence of an act of supplier or his employee, which includes supply of equipment or material with patent or latent defects
or sub-standard services;
(c) the nuclear incident has resulted from the act of commission or omission of an individual done with the intent to cause nuclear damage.
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and UAE, respectively.36
The approach of India has been in contrast to the rest of the
international nuclear industry. India has its own national nuclear
liability that is set out in The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act
(2010).37 One signiﬁcant difference compared to other liability re-
gimes is that liability is not exclusively channelled to the operator.
Nuclear suppliers are also prospectively liable and this is speciﬁed
in Section 17 of the Act (as detailed in Table 3). India has also signed36 World Nuclear Association, ‘Nuclear Power in Turkey’ (October 2015) <http://
www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Proﬁles/Countries-T-Z/Turkey/> accessed 9
January 2016; World Nuclear Association, ‘Nuclear Power in the United Arab
Emirates’ (September 2015) <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Proﬁles/
Countries-T-Z/United-Arab-Emirates/> accessed 9 January 2016.
37 Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act 2010 <http://dae.nic.in/sites/default/ﬁles/
civilnucliab.pdf> accessed 9 January 2016.the CSC (see Section 5). However, Section 17 contravenes the Annex
of the CSC.38 The intention in this paper is not to discuss in depth
the clause (b) in Section 17, but to highlight more its ambiguity or
vagueness.
The intent behind the direction by India in terms of civil nuclear
liability is unclear. If anything it effectively prevents foreign sup-
pliers from operating in India and it has stalled industry progress.
This it seems was contrary to one of the intentions of The Civil Li-
ability for Nuclear Damage Act in India, which was to attract foreign
nuclear technology investment.39 Compensation for major38 Arghya Sengupta and Sanhita Ambast, ‘A Dangerous Recourse? A Critical Relook
at Section 17 of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, 2010’ (2012) 3 Interna-
tional Journal of Nuclear Law 292.
39 MP Ram Mohan, ‘Nuclear Liability Law of India: An Appraisal of Extent of Lia-
bility, Right of Recourse and Transboundary Applicability’ (2014) 17 Journal of Risk
Research 115.
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issue in India after the Bhopal disaster in 1984where compensation
was extremely slow in been received by victims and that was if it
was received at all.40 There may be an attempt to avoid similar
problems, but if anything the new law createsmore confusion.41 For
example in its current state, a victim of a nuclear accident may have
to take a multitude of court cases against several suppliers and the
operatordespecially in the instance where the operator invokes
Section 17 clause (b) “the nuclear incident has resulted as a
consequence of an act of supplier or his employee” (see Table 3). In
this context, it is also unclear in terms of administrative law if the
Indian court systems has improved in terms of speed to compen-
sate claimants; and especially in light of this been an issue after the
Bhopal accident. It has been noted in the literature that the Indian
legal system is far from being in a situation to manage the legal
consequences of a nuclear accident.42
Overall, many authors are positive towards the Indian approach
to nuclear liability regime and its imposition of liability on suppliers
though it is not exactly clear why.43 There are several themes that
emerge. One of these is that the international nuclear liability
regime is in need of reform and the Indian approach is the way
forward. This is despite one commentator noting that “In fact, in
India, the operator companies will also be wholly government-
owned, which could explain in part why the Indian government
chose to introduce an expanded concept of supplier liability”.44 Yet
this issue is never addressed. There also seems to be a distrust of
foreign companies in the sector and also perhaps distrust in the
state nuclear company d Nuclear Power Corporation of India
Limited (NPCIL) d which will operate the nuclear reactors in the
country. Indeed, a case that was before the Indian courts in 2004
highlighted this problemd People's Union for Civil Liberties v Union
of India (2004) 2 SCC 476d and this case concerned the disclosure
of 130 issues of safety concern by the Atomic Energy Regulatory
Board.45 The disclosure was held not to be in the Indian State's
interest and to be an issue of national security. This case highlighted
the widespread view that the Indian nuclear industry operated
under a veil of secrecy.46,47
A signiﬁcant oversight in the academic literature concerns the
role of the nuclear safety regulator in India (Atomic Energy Regu-
latory Board, AERB) and its effect on India's relationship with the
international nuclear liability regimes. There has just been one
notable review of the AERB and other government agencies in India40 A similar argument is made by Ted Jones, ‘NEI Nuclear Notes: Why India's
Nuclear Liability Law Is Harming Indian Interests' <http://neinuclearnotes.blogspot.
co.uk/2013/10/why-indias-nuclear-liability-law-is.html> accessed 9 January 2015.
41 Ayushi Sutaria, ‘Placing the Indian Civil Nuclear Liability Regime in Context: The
Extent of Supplier's Liability’ (2014) 17 Journal of Risk Research 97.
42 Anupam Jha, ‘Dynamics of Legal Regime on Safety of Nuclear Power Plants in
India after Fukushima Disaster’ (2014) 17 Journal of Risk Research 145.
43 Arya Hariharan, ‘India's Nuclear Civil Liability Bill and Supplier's Liability: One
Step Towards Modernizing the Outdated International Nuclear Liability Regime’
(2011) 36 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 223; Mohit Abraham, Nuclear Liability:
A Key Component of the Public Policy Decision to Deploy Nuclear Energy in Southeast
Asia - American Academy of Arts & Sciences (American Academy of Arts and Sciences
2014) <https://www.amacad.org/content/publications/publication.aspx?d¼1499>
accessed 9 January 2016; MV Ramana and Suvrat Raju, ‘Nuclear Safety before
Vendor Interests’ The Hindu (30 October 2012) <http://www.thehindu.com/
opinion/op-ed/nuclear-safety-before-vendor-interests/article4044438.ece>
accessed 9 January 2016; MV Ramana and Suvrat Raju, ‘Proﬁtability without
Accountability’ The Hindu (16 February 2015) <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/
op-ed/comment-proﬁtability-without-accountability/article6898851.ece> accessed
9 January 2016.
44 Abraham (n 43).
45 Jha (n 42).
46 ibid.
47 Yash Thomas Mannully, ‘Law Relating to Nuclear Liability and Compensation in
India’ (2010) 3 International Journal of Nuclear Law 112.such as the Department of Atomic Energy and the Atomic Energy
Commission. In this case the roles of the Indian government, the
AERB and the other latter agencies have been heavily criticised with
the authors pointing three key problems which have served to
reduce the importance of the need for India to sign an international
nuclear liability convention. These are: (1) the attitude that is
demonstrated by comments made by the Chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission who stated that the probability of an accident
was ‘one in inﬁnity’; (2) the lack of independence of the AERB from
the inﬂuence of Government; and (3) the comment by the Secre-
tary of the Department of Atomic Energy who stated that Indian
reactors were 100 per cent safe.48
The regulator has a role to ensure safety in the activities of the
suppliers, as has the nuclear operator. Not allowing liability to be
passed on to suppliers does not reduce the role of the AERB to
ensure that suppliers provide safe, reliable and non-defective
equipment and services. Even NPCIL has commented that the ef-
fect of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (2010) in India will
be to reduce business activity in the Indian nuclear energy industry
to a standstill.49
Nevertheless, it is clear that despite the introduction of the Civil
Liability for Nuclear Damage Bill in India, there remains a realisa-
tion that the issue of supplier liability is important in the nuclear
energy industry. Further clariﬁcation will happen in this area, and
in particular after the recent meeting in January 2015 between the
US and India between their Presidents, Barack Obama and Naren-
dra Modi, respectively. The outcome of this meeting will ensure
there is a limit to the amount a supplier will be liable for in the
event of a nuclear accident e though exact speciﬁcs still have yet to
emerge.50 In June 2015, a Rs 1500 crore ($234 million) Indian nu-
clear insurance pool was announced - this insurance pool com-
prises domestic insurers plus Nuclear Risk Insurers which manages
the UK's nuclear insurance pool.51
In India, it seems the operator will not have strict liability until
there is a major shift in Indian legislation. In particular, the supplier
needs to consider the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Rules
(2011) that apply from the same day the Civil Liability for Nuclear
Damage Act went into force (11 November 2011).52 The three main
issues as identiﬁed by a Committee on Subordinate Legislation of
the Lok Sabha, which produced a Report on the Civil Liability for48 MV Ramana and Ashwin Kumar, ‘“One in Inﬁnity”: Failing to Learn from Acci-
dents and Implications for Nuclear Safety in India’ (2014) 17 Journal of Risk
Research 23; ibid 27..
49 Zee News, ‘N-Liability Bill Changes Tough, No Supplier Will Come: NPCIL’ (Zee
News, 24 August 2010) <http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/n-liability-bill-
changes-tough-no-supplier-will-come-npcil_650351.html > accessed 9 January
2016.
50 Dan Roberts, ‘Obama and Modi Agree to Limit US Liability in Case of Nuclear
Disaster’ The Guardian (Delhi, India, 25 January 2015) <http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2015/jan/25/obama-modi-limit-us-liability-nuclear-disaster> accessed
9 January 2016.; Ministry of External Affairs (Government of India), ‘Frequently
Asked Questions and Answers on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act 2010 and
related issues (28 February 2015) <http://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/
24766/FrequentlyþAskedþQuestionsþandþAnswersþonþCivilþLiabilityþforþ
NuclearþDamageþActþ2010þandþrelatedþissues > accessed 27 July 2015, which
notably states that “Section 17 states that the operator shall have a right of recourse.
While it provides a substantive right to the operator, it is not a mandatory but an
enabling provision. In other words it permits but does not require an operator to
include in the contract or exercise a right of recourse.”
51 World Nuclear Association, ‘Nuclear Power in India’ (January 2016) <http://
www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Proﬁles/Countries-G-N/India/
#NuclearLiability> accessed 9 January 2016.
52 The Civil Liability For Nuclear Damage Rules, 2011 <http://dae.nic.in/
writereaddata/liab_rules.pdf> accessed 27 July 2015.
Table 4
Issues concerning Rule 24 of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage (CLND) Act, 2011. OECD, ‘Annual Report on India’ (2012) 90 OECD-NEA Nuclear Law Bulletin 119.
“ - Rule 24(1) provides that any contract under S. 17(a) of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act shall not be for an amount less than the amount of the operator liability
speciﬁed under S. 6(2) of the CLND Act, or the value of the contract itself, whichever is less.
- Rule 24(2) states that the right of recourse referred to in Rule 24(1) shall be for the duration of the initial licence issued under the Atomic Energy (Radiation Protection)
Rules, 2004, or the product liability period, whichever is longer. Such initial licence is granted for ﬁve years.
- Section 6(1) of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act speciﬁes that the maximum amount of liability with respect to each nuclear incident shall be SDRs 300 million
(approximately USD 450 million) or such higher amount as may be notiﬁed by the government of India. Section 6(2) further subdivides the liability of an operator for
each nuclear incident, and with respect to nuclear reactors having thermal power equal to or above ten MW, it shall amount to Rupees 1500 Crores (approximately USD
292.4 million).”
59 Japan Atomic Energy Commission (Yoshihiro Nagaoki), ‘Estimation of Accident
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outlined in Table 4 below.
In essence Rule 24 aims to limit the wide scope of Section 17 (b)
of the Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (see Table 3) both
limiting the right of recourse of an operator on a supplier in time
and the ﬁnancial amount. However, it is perhaps not sufﬁciently
unambiguous in asserting these limits. Also, the question as to
whether Rule 24 is enforceable over Section 17 (b) of the Civil Li-
ability for Nuclear Damage Act remains open. Indeed, it has been
asserted that Rule 24 could not be relied upon. It is not only
inconsistent with Section 17 (b) but would also be prohibited by the
Indian Supreme Court.54 Hence, despite the introduction of Rule 24,
the situation remains the same and is why the US nuclear industry
have sought, through the intervention of President Obama, further
clariﬁcation of the issue of supplier liability in India.
4. A comparative focus between nuclear and non-nuclear
energy sectors
In many analyses of the nuclear liability regime, it has been held
that a major nuclear accident will be extremely costly, with some
studies suggesting that it could cost as much as £5000 billion.55 In
general these studies allude that the existing ﬁnancial limits of li-
ability are insufﬁcient and therefore it is considered that the nu-
clear energy industry is in receipt of a subsidy.56 The various
approaches to calculating the damages from a nuclear accident by
these studies can be excessive. Recent cost estimates on nuclear
energy accidents from the Institute for Radiological Protection and
Nuclear Safety (IRSN) in France estimates the cost of ~V120 billion
for a severe nuclear accident and ~V430 billion for a major nuclear
accident, such as Chernobyl or Fukushima, occurring in France.57 As
of 2014, ~$21 billion has been claimed from the accident at
Fukushima Daiichi.58 The current projected cost of Fukushima is53 Committee on Subordinate Legislation, Lok Sabha Secretariat, The Civil Liability
For Nuclear Damage Rules, 2011 <http://164.100.47.134/lsscommittee/Subordinate%
20Legislation/27%20Report%20nuclear.pdf> accessed 9 January 2016.
54 Sengupta and Ambast (n 38).
55 Hans-Jürgen Ewers and Klaus Rennings, ‘Economics of Nuclear Risks d A
German Study’ in Olav Hohmeyer and Richard L Ottinger (eds), Social Costs of Energy
(Springer Berlin Heidelberg 1994) <http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-
3-642-85120-9_11> accessed 27 July 2015; Duncan EJ Currie, ‘Problems and Gaps
in the Nuclear Liability Conventions and an Analysis of How an Actual Claim Would
Be Brought under the Current Existing Treaty Regime in the Event of a Nuclear
Accident, The’ (2006) 35 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 85.
56 Jeffrey A Dubin and Geoffrey S Rothwell, ‘Subsidy to Nuclear Power Through
PriceeAnderson Liability Limit’ (1990) 8 Contemporary Economic Policy 73; An-
thony G Heyes and Catherine Liston-Heyes, ‘Subsidy to Nuclear Power Through
PriceeAnderson Liability Limit: Comment’ (1998) 16 Contemporary Economic
Policy 122.
57 Patrick Momal, ‘The Cost of Nuclear Accidents’, NEA Workshop on Approaches
to Estimation of the Costs of Nuclear Accidents, May 2013 <http://www.oecd-nea.
org/ndd/workshops/aecna/presentations/documents/PatrickMomal-
Costestimationmethodology.pdf> accessed 9 January 2016.
58 Toyohiro Nomura, ‘The Japanese experience on claims management after the
Fukushima Daiichi accident’, Stakeholder Conference on Nuclear Third Party Lia-
bility and Insurance, January 21 and 22, 2014 <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/
events/international-workshop-nuclear-liability> accessed 9 January 2016.estimated at ~V36.5 billion which is signiﬁcantly below the IRSN
ﬁgures59 but much greater than the $12.6 billion U.S. insurance
pool and theV1.5 billion limit of the RPCþ RBSC. Hence, discussion
is presently focussed onwhat the lower limit of third-party nuclear
liability should be and how the insurance sector can increase its
coverage.
As a comparison, accidents in offshore oil and gas can be very
costly in terms of human life and ﬁnancially. For example, themajor
accident at the Piper Alpha rig in the North Sea in the UK on 6 July
1988 caused 167 fatalities.60 Piper Alpha cost $1.4 billion ($3.6
billion in 2014 US$ values) in insurance claims and was unprece-
dented for the sector in realising the potential scale and spread of
insurable claims across geographical and business scope.61 The
operating company, Occidental, paid £66 million to families of the
deceased, but this compensation was not awarded through the UK
criminal or civil courts.62
More recently, the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in the Gulf of
Mexico in 2010 (which began on the 20 April 2010) caused so far
has cost BP near $43 billion, as outlined in Table 5.63 This may be set
to increase further with BP having been found grossly negligent in
its activities that may have led to a potential ﬁne of $18 billion
under the Clean Water Act by the US courts.64 That ﬁgure was then
reduced to a $13.7 billion in the US courts but the expectation was
that the Judge would seek a ﬁne close to that maximum amount
that will take the cost of the accident close to $55 billiondwith a
ﬁnal decision expected in the summer of 2015.65
The ﬁnal ﬁne is estimated to be $5.5 billion under the Clean
Water Act penalty, with an additional $7.3 billion for natural
resource damages, $4.9 billion in economic claims to ﬁve states and
$1 billion in 400 local government claims e however, it is expectedRisk Cost of Nuclear Power Plants’, NEA Workshop on Approaches to Estimation of
the Costs of Nuclear Accidents, May 2013 <http://www.oecd-nea.org/ndd/
workshops/aecna/presentations/documents/YoshihiroNAGAOKI-
EstimationofAccidentRiskCostofNPP.pdf> accessed 9 January 2016.
60 Cullen, W. D. 1990. The public inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster. Department
of Energy: London, HMSO, London, UK.
61 Lloyd's, ‘1988 The Piper Alpha Explosion.’ (28 May 2013) <http://www.lloyds.
com/lloyds/about-us/history/catastrophes-and-claims/piper-alpha> accessed 9
January 2016; Lloyd's, ‘Piper Alpha after the Fire’ (5 July 2013) <http://www.lloyds.
com/news-and-insight/news-and-features/market-news/industry-news-2013/
piper-alpha-after-the-ﬁre> accessed 9 January 2016.
62 Terry Macalister, ‘Piper Alpha Disaster: How 167 Oil Rig Workers Died’ The
Guardian (4 July 2013) <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/jul/04/piper-
alpha-disaster-167-oil-rig> accessed 9 January 2016.
63 Margaret Cronin Fisk, Brian Swint and Laurel Brubaker Calkins, ‘BP's Oil Spill
Deal Sours as Claims Add Billions to Cost - Bloomberg Business' Bloomberg (4 June
2013) <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-06-04/bp-s-oil-spill-
settlement-sours-as-claims-add-billions> accessed 9 January 2016.
64 Margaret Cronin Fisk and Jef Feeley, ‘BP Found Grossly Negligent in 2010 Gulf of
Mexico Spill’ Bloomberg (4 September 2014) <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2014-09-04/bp-found-grossly-negligent-in-2010-gulf-of-mexico-spill>
accessed 9 January 2016.
65 For a recent discussion on the penultimate stage of the BP Ruling, see Dominic
Rushe, ‘Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Legal Saga Enters Final Chapter’ The Guardian
(19 January 2015) <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jan/19/bp-oil-
spill-deepwater-horizon-ﬁnal-ﬁne-clean-water-act> accessed 9 January2016.
Table 5
Cost to BP of BP deepwater horizon oil spill.a
Issue Amount BP has spent/set aside, in 2010 US$
Litigation and settlement cots $25.87 billion
Spill response costs $14.30 billion
Clean Water Act penalties $3.51 billion
Environmental costs $3.03 billion
Other costs $1.94 billion
Sub-total $48.65 billion
Less recoveries $5.68 billion
Total $42.97 billion
a Daniel Gilbert and Justin Scheck, ‘BP Is Found Grossly Negligent in Deepwater
Horizon Disaster’ Wall Street Journal (5 September 2014) <http://www.wsj.com/
articles/u-s-judge-ﬁnds-bp-grossly-negligent-in-2010-deepwater-horizon-
disaster-1409842182> accessed 9 January 2016.
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and the expectation is BP will deduct the majority of these ﬁnes out
of taxes.66
Similar to the nuclear industry, oil industry liability rests with
the operator. This is mainly achieved through Knock-for-Knock
indemnity contracts.67 The offshore oil and gas industry has no
similar third-party agreements such as the PC, the VC, or the CSCd
with the exception of transportation. The marine oil sector for oil
tankers has an international liability regime governed by the In-
ternational Marine Organization to which 133 countries are sig-
natory.68 Oil tanker accidents are insured for betweenV7million to
V136 million depending on units carried and two mechanisms are
in place if the cost of the accident exceeds this to pay further
compensation: (1) the International Oil Pollution Compensation
Fund (IOPC) 1992 increases the amount up to 203million SDRs; and
(2) the IOPC 2003 Supplementary Fund Protocol raises this to 750
million SDRs.69 Even still this compensation fund may not be suf-
ﬁcient, as highlighted by the Exxon-Valdez oil spill that yielded
punitive damages of $5 billion (in 1995 US$).70
A key issue for the operator, BP, as a result of the Deepwater
Horizon disaster, was again the broadening of scope of damages
beyond that experienced with Piper Alpha. Timeliness was also a
key issue for BP in settling claims; even though they have since
argued they settled too early in some cases,71 due in part, to the
division of geographical areas into settlement zones according to
proximity to the spill.
There are two major lessons for the nuclear insurance industry66 BP, ‘BP to Settle Federal, State and Local Deepwater Horizon Claims for up to
$18.7 Billion With Payments to Be Spread Over 18 Years’ (2 July 2015) <http://www.
bp.com/en/global/corporate/press/press-releases/bp-to-settle-federal-state-local-
deepwater-horizon-claims.html> accessed 9 January 2016; Daniel Gilbert and Sarah
Kent, ‘BP Agrees to Pay $18.7 Billion to Settle Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Claims’
Wall Street Journal (2 July 2015) <http://www.wsj.com/articles/bp-agrees-to-pay-
18-7-billion-to-settle-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill-claims-1435842739> accessed 9
January 2016.
67 For more on Knock-for-Knock contracts see: Chidi Egbchue, ‘Reviewing “Knock
for Knock” Indemnities Following the Macondo Well Blowout’ (2013) 7 Construc-
tion Law International 7.
68 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC),
<http://www.imo.org/About/Conventions/ListOfConventions/Pages/International-
Convention-on-Civil-Liability-for-Oil-Pollution-Damage-%28CLC%29.aspx>
accessed 9 January 2016.
69 The International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, <http://www.iopcfunds.
org/about-us/legal-framework/1992-fund-convention-and-supplementary-fund-
protocol/> accessed 9 January 2016.
70 RT Paine and others, ‘TROUBLE ON OILED WATERS: Lessons from the Exxon
Valdez Oil Spill’ (1996) 27 Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 197.
71 Associated Press in New Orleans, ‘Judge Orders BP to Stick by Deepwater Ho-
rizon Payouts Agreement’ The Guardian <http://www.theguardian.com/
environment/2014/sep/24/bp-ordered-deepwater-horizon-payouts-agreement>
accessed 9 January 2016.from the BP Deepwater Horizon case and these are:
(1) timeliness is very important in the claims management
process; and
(2) each major accident in the oil and gas sector will mean an
increase in the scope and scale of those individuals and en-
tities that seek, and can claim damages.
These are similar to what has happened in the nuclear energy
sector after its major accidents. Chernobyl, as stated earlier,
broadened the scope of the categories of damage that could be
claimed and prompted updates to the nuclear liability regime.
Fukushima Daiichi has shown that timeliness is very important and
that again the scope for claiming by those affected to some degree
by the accident has also increased. The logic dictates that as a result
of a future accident in the nuclear energy sector, the scope of claims
will increase. In essence, the deﬁnition of loss may expand and
become more inclusive and expansive. There maybe other reasons
for this in that, public trust in the industry is considered of vital
importance and a return to ‘business as usual’ as soon as possible is
more important for the industry than the amount of compensation
ﬁnally claimed.725. Conclusion and future outlook
After Fukushima Daiichi, as after Chernobyl, the accident
prompted a desire to review and possibly to reform the nuclear
liability regime to ensure victims are adequately compensated.73
To-date discussion around the global nuclear liability regime post
Fukushima Daiichi has received little attention in academic litera-
ture and this article aims to address this. Over the next few years,
the global nuclear liability regime is set to come under scrutiny at
an international institutional level, and in particular, because of
developments in the EU and also due to the CSC coming into force.
The EU has so far played a lead role in reviewing the interna-
tional global nuclear liability regime. The EU held a meeting on this
subject matter in January 2014.74 The meeting was preceded by an
EC Public consultation on nuclear liability75 and the ambition of
this meeting was to build on this consultation and also begin to
draft a new approach for nuclear liability within the EU. The ne-
cessity of the consultation by the EU Commission and the need for a
revision of the liability regime had been previously questioned in
2013 by the nuclear industry.76 Observations from the January 2014
meeting were no clearer, though it was highlighted that there were
lessons to be learned from the accident at Fukushima Daiichi. In
particular, these related to the claims management process, an72 This point is addressed further in Section 5 though is an area in need of further
research.
73 This does prompt the argument that the development of nuclear law needs to
be more proactive and is too reactive at the moment. It should not wait until there
is an accident to reform. See the following for more discussion on this though a
different reason is asserted for why nuclear law should be more proactive in its
formulation: RJ Heffron, ‘The Need for Proactive over Reactive Nuclear Law for the
International Nuclear Industry’ (2013) 11 Oil, Gas & Energy Law Journal (OGEL)
<https://www.ogel.org/article.asp?key¼3335> accessed 9 January 2016.
74 Stakeholder Conference on Nuclear Third Party Liability and Insurance, January
20 and 21, 2014 <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/events/international-workshop-
nuclear-liability> accessed 9 January 2016.
75 EC Public consultation on nuclear liability <https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/
consultations/consultation-nuclear-liability> accessed 9 January 2016.
76 Carolina Parra-Serrano, ‘Necessity of New EU Nuclear Liability Proposals
Questioned by Industry’ [2013] Post Magazine <http://m.postonline.co.uk/post/
news/2302292/necessity-of-new-eu-nuclear-liability-proposals-questioned-by-
industry> accessed 9 January 2016.
Table 6
Estimated Nuclear Reactors under the Scope of the CSC International Nuclear Liability Regime. Constructed by the authors using data contained in n 79 and n 83.
Country/region Number of reactors Capacity (MWth)
In operation Under construction Total In operation Under construction Total
CSC contracting states
Argentina 3 1 4 5354 100 5454
Japan 48 2 50 131,073 7852 138,925
Morocco 0 0 0 0 0 0
Romania 2 0 2 4360 0 4360
UAE 0 3 3 0 11,949 11,949
United States 99 5 104 306,274 17,025 323,299
152 11 163 447,061 36,926 483,987
CSC signatories
India 21 6 27 19,771 12,819 32,590
Canada 19 0 19 45,487 0 45,487
Czech Rep. 6 0 6 12,016 0 12,016
Ukraine 15 2 17 41,750 6400 48,150
61 8 69 119,024 19,219 138,243
Noted CSC non-signatories
South Korea 24 4 28 62,703 15,752 78,455
China 24 25 49 59,459 73,912 133,461
48 29 77 122,252 89,664 211,916
R.J. Heffron et al. / Progress in Nuclear Energy 90 (2016) 1e10 9issue that Japanese national authorities struggled with initially.77
In contrast, the US is pursuing a different agenda, and is pushing
the CSC as the global solution towards third-party nuclear liabil-
ity,78 especially recommending that a country's national law needs
be in line with the Annex of the CSC. At present six countries have
ratiﬁed the CSC, these are: Argentina, Morocco, Romania, Japan,
UAE, and the USA (which from Table 6 totals 152 reactors in oper-
ation and 11 reactors under construction) and came into force on 15
April 2015.79 There are 13 other signatories, four of which have
installed nuclear capacity, including: Canada, Czech Republic, India,
and Ukraine.80 Japanwas the most recent country to sign and ratify
the CSC, and with 48 nuclear reactors of installed operation, and
brought the CSC into force on 15 April 2015.81 However, it is un-
likely that all of Japan's capacity will come back online, with recent
estimates from Reuters,82 coupled with data from the IAEA's Power
Reactor Information System,83 suggesting that circa a third of the
48 nuclear reactors are likely to come back online; a third and their
return to operation remains uncertain; and the ﬁnal third unlikely
to come back into operation. Nevertheless, the CSC is now in force.
This paper has assessed what the international nuclear regimes
are (in Section 2). In Section 3 the effect of these regimes is high-
lighted through Fig. 1 where the map of Europe shows the effect of
the ‘patchwork’ of conventions that are in force which results in
varying levels of liability amounts and ﬁnancial security limits. The
absence of a common coherent liability regime that is accessible to
victims raises many issues, but principally the question of whether
there is merit in the range of international nuclear liability regimes
themselves. Section 3 also discusses the nuclear liability regime in77 n 74.
78 Ben McRae, ‘The Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear
Damage: Catalyst for a Global Nuclear Liability Regime’ (2007) 79 OECD-NEA Nu-
clear Law Bulletin 17.
79 International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘Convention on Supplementary Compen-
sation for Nuclear Damage’ (Latest Status: 17 April 2015) <https://www.iaea.org/
Publications/Documents/Conventions/supcomp_status.pdf> accessed 9 January
2016.
80 ibid
81 As this bring the total installed capacity to more than 400,000 MWth, a con-
dition needed to bring the CSC into force as mentioned in Section 2C.
82 Reuters, ‘FACTBOX-Outlook for Japan Nuclear Reactor Re-Starts’ Reuters (1 April
2014) <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/01/japan-nuclear-restarts-
idINL4N0MT0K020140401> accessed 9 January 2016.
83 All units of installed capacity taken from International Atomic Energy Agency,
‘Power Reactor Information System’ <http://www.iaea.org/PRIS/home.aspx>
accessed 9 January 2016.India where it is evident that India has to engage in reform of its
own domestic liability laws before further development will
happen in relation to being a signatory to an international nuclear
liability regime. 84 In the penultimate section, it is clear that from a
comparative focus between nuclear and non-nuclear energy sec-
tors that the international nuclear industry is more advanced in its
approach to accidents. Non-nuclear energy sectors have lower lia-
bility limits and yet (based on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill)
result in similar if not higher amounts of compensation. Further, it
will in more likelihood be necessary to pursue action in the courts
after an accident for a non-nuclear energy sector as there is not the
same cooperation on liability as there is in the nuclear energy
sector.
The effect of the Fukushima Daiichi accident is set to continue
on the nuclear energy sector in relation to liability and compen-
sation. Indeed, issues are around compensation and accidents are a
contentious area and as one legal scholar noted: “One thing seems
clear. If we are concerned… with accident compensation, the tort
law system is unsatisfactory.”85 The debate will continue and in
relation to the nuclear energy sector and liability, Burns (2012)
highlights the essence of the future direction that research in the
area should take:
“The Fukushima Daiichi accident brings a new focus to the in-
ternational liability debate, one that is not merely about theo-
retical problems and impacts of a nuclear accident. In my own
view, the accident does not so much newly reveal heretofore
“unknowable” or “unthinkable” events and impacts as it does
the need for conscientious re-dedication to the essential tenets
of nuclear safety and the courage to face the “what ifs” and
consequences of an accident.”
The area of nuclear liability identiﬁes with previous literature on
the issue of torts and accidents and the law, in that it is an area that84 Mannully (n 47), who stated that India can be characterized as having an
“inadequate development of tort law and lack of legal and legislative developments
in the area of complex liability cases.”; World Nuclear Association, ‘Civil Liability for
Nuclear Damage’ (June 2015) <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Safety-and-
Security/Safety-of-Plants/Liability-for-Nuclear-Damage/> accessed 9 January 2016.
85 R Ian McEwin, ‘No-Fault Compensation Systems’ in Boudewijn Bouckaert and
Gerrit De Geest (eds), Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Volume II. Civil Law and
Economics. (Edward Elgar 2000) 745 <http://encyclo.ﬁndlaw.com/3600book.pdf>
accessed 9 January 2016.
R.J. Heffron et al. / Progress in Nuclear Energy 90 (2016) 1e1010has been recognised as complex and where there remains a lack of
a deﬁnitive way forward. It is certain that after a nuclear accident
there is a need to restore public trust in the industry and in essence,
there needs to be less uncertainty as to how to achieve this. There is
no immediate solution but certainly the possibility of the harmo-
nisation of the current regimes needs further examination, how-
ever, new departures such as what has happened in India do not
indicate a way forward.86 In particular, developments between
Rosatom and its plans to build in Finland, India and Turkey point
towards further complexity with international nuclear liability re-
gimes. All three countries have signed separate and different
bilateral agreements with Russia relating to nuclear liability.87
Finally, while an accident within the nuclear sector may inevi-
tably exceed the amount stated in the legal liability cap though to
what extent will be determined by the characteristics of the acci-
dent and the response to the accident. Nevertheless, it is evident86 This is similar to the view expressed by Robert J Gruendel and Els Reynaers Kini,
‘Through the Looking Glass’ (2012) 2012 Nuclear Law Bulletin 45,who stated in
relation to the Indian “variations among national liability regimes may exacerbate
the phenomenon of fragmentation of international conventions pertaining to the
nuclear sector”.
87 In Finland's (Paris Convention) case it has signed an agreement with Russia
(Vienna Convention) that in effect agrees that the Joint Protocol will be in force for
that project, World Nuclear Association, ‘Nuclear Power in Finland’ (17 July 2015)
<http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Proﬁles/Countries-A-F/Finland/>
accessed 9 January 2016; In India there is an agreement that India will determine
the insurance premium for each component and Russia will pay this premium for
20 years, Sonal Patel, ‘India's Nuclear Liability Law: Breakthrough for Russia,
Stalemate Endures for U.S.’ (POWER Magazine, 5 January 2014) <http://www.
powermag.com/indias-nuclear-liability-law-breakthrough-for-russia-stalemate-
endures-for-u-s/> accessed 9 January 2016; In Turkey, where Rosatom is building a
nuclear plant at Sinop, Russia and Turkey have signed a bilateral agreement where
the project will be subject to the “international agreements and instruments to
which the Republic of Turkey is or will be a party and national laws and regulations
of the Turkish Party”. Please see: Agreement Between the Government of the Re-
public of Turkey and the Government of the Russian Federation on Cooperation in
Relation to the Construction and Operation of a Nuclear Power Plant at the Akkuyu
Site in the Republic of Turkey, Article 16, OG No.27721 of 6 October 2010 (also in
English), as quoted in Erinç Ercan and Horst Schneider, ‘Turkish Nuclear Legislation:
Developments for a Nuclear Newcomer’ (2013) 92 OECD-NEA Nuclear Law Bulletin
29.that the issue of liability in the nuclear energy sector is not a unique
question when accidents and the energy sector are considered. If
anything, the nuclear energy sector is further along the in the
process of resolving this issue than in other parts of the energy
sector, for example, in the offshore oil and gas industry.Acknowledgements
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